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ABSTRACT
Automotive navigation systems, especially portable navi-
gation devices (PNDs), are gaining popularity worldwide.
Drivers increasingly rely on these devices to guide them to
their destination. Some follow them almost blindly, with
devastating consequences if the routing goes wrong. Wrong
messages as well as superfluous and unnecessary messages
can potentially reduce the credibility of those devices. We
performed a comparative study with current PNDs from dif-
ferent vendors and market segments, in order to assess the
extent of this problem and how it is related to the inter-
action between device and driver. In this paper, we report
the corresponding results and identify multiple interaction
weaknesses that are prevalent throughout all tested device
classes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems]: Human factors; H.5.2
[User Interfaces]: Evaluation/Methodology; H.5.2 [User
Interfaces]: Ergonomics
General Terms
Human Factors, Experimentation
Keywords
HCI, personal navigation devices (PND), study
1. INTRODUCTION
Automotive navigation systems have become an assistant
technology many drivers rely on. Navigation systems are ei-
ther directly integrated in the vehicle or come as add-on solu-
tions, like dedicated portable navigation devices (PNDs), or
smartphone software solutions. By navigation system we re-
fer to a device or component that performs routing decisions
locally, in contrast to online routing services where some or
all routing calculations are performed by servers online. In
this work, we focus on PNDs, due to their widespread adop-
tion and global market share [5].
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Frequent drivers, business travelers, vocational drivers, and
families entrust their navigation systems with finding a suit-
able route to their destinations. Nowadays, some drivers fol-
low them almost blindly, i.e., by reacting instantaneously to
driving directions announced by the device. Such blind trust
can lead to dangerous situations as underlined by anecdotal
reports of people driving their cars into a river because they
followed the commands of their navigation system too liter-
ally [7]. However, the case of a German driver who caused an
accident by turning around on a highway because his satel-
lite navigation systems told him so [6] underlines the serious-
ness of the problem. Hanowski et al. [4] were able to show
that the confidence placed in the commands of a navigation
system and its credibility increases with the driver’s unfa-
miliarity with the environment. They also showed that the
driver’s self-confidence decreases in such situations. Thus,
the further away drivers are from their known environment,
the more they rely on their navigation systems and trust
their commands. In such situations drivers may also be-
come susceptible to gullibility errors [3], which could result
in them acting upon erroneous commands that they would
most likely reject under normal conditions.
1.1 The Credibility Issue
Apparently, credibility is an important aspect of the problem
at hand. Fogg and Tseng [3] distinguish between different
types of credibility of software systems. Presumed credibility
is based on general assumptions about the functionality of
a system, surface credibility is attributed based on the im-
pression made by the hardware and interface design, reputed
credibility stems from the recommendations and opinions of
third parties, while experienced credibility is based on earlier
personal experiences. The first three aspects are prevalent
in forming the initial credibility a driver attributes to the
navigation system. However, experienced credibility evolves
over time. While the first three credibility aspects in com-
bination with unfamiliar environments may facilitate gulli-
bility errors, the consequence of such an error will almost
certainly destroy experienced credibility of the navigation
system. Mistrust towards future commands of the device
will be the result.
In familiar environments, a slightly different situation un-
folds. Drivers feel more confident and due to their back-
ground knowledge can better judge the correctness of nav-
igation commands, at least to a certain extent. There-
fore, the danger of drivers acting upon erroneous commands
should decrease. But in a familiar environment drivers also
form their own (not necessarily correct) belief what the best
route would be in a given situation. A mismatch between
the planned route of the navigation system and the driver’s
belief of the best route is possible. Drivers may deliberately
deviate from the suggested route to evade traffic jams or
to make a purposeful detour, e.g., to stop at the grocery
store, or because they think they know a shortcut. Typi-
cally, navigation systems react by issuing commands to lead
the driver back onto the planned route or a newly calcu-
lated alternative route. But because the driver deliberately
deviated from the route such messages will be considered
annoying especially if they occur repeatedly. It is likely that
such annoying or superfluous commands also have a negative
effect on the experienced credibility of the device.
Another feature that may cause similar effects is the inte-
gration of dynamic traffic information in the routing pro-
cess. Some navigation systems can receive dynamic traffic
messages from different sources to inform the driver about
traffic obstructions ahead and to suggest a detour. While
potentially a useful service, the presentation of such infor-
mation can impact the experienced credibility of the system.
For example, displaying the age of a traffic message would
be a useful indicator to judge its relevance and accuracy,
while its absence may foster gullibility errors, if the naviga-
tion system suggests a detour to avoid a traffic jam based on
information that is hours old. Furthermore, the benefit of
a detour needs to be apparent to drivers and should match
their understanding of an appropriate alternative route.
Thus, the credibility of navigation systems can be reduced
by gullibility errors, but superfluous or annoying messages
can also impact it negatively. The experienced credibility
can potentially degrade to such a level that incredulity er-
rors occur [3]. Drivers would ignore navigation commands
because they doubt their accuracy, even if following these
commands would actually benefit them. This of course can
lead to a further decrease of experienced credibility. In ad-
dition, the exchange of negative experiences between cus-
tomers can also decrease the reputed credibility of a prod-
uct. Therefore it is in the best interest of vendors to ensure
that not only presumed and surface credibility remain high
but also experienced and reputed credibility.
1.2 Contribution & Outline
In this work, we analyze the extent of interaction issues of
PNDs, which may cause credibility deterioration. In partic-
ular, we focus on the frequency of superfluous and erroneous
messages and the integration of dynamic traffic warnings.
We performed a comparative study with PNDs of different
vendors under real world conditions to assess their inter-
action behavior with the driver. Based on the results, we
identified weaknesses in the interaction process and particu-
larly problematic scenarios. As part of a structured research
approach, these results will be used in future work to assess
credibility deterioration in navigation systems and to de-
velop optimized interaction processes for such devices.
Section 2 provides background information on navigation
systems with a focus on information sources that impact
routing decisions and navigation commands. Section 3 out-
lines the setup of our study, and Section 4 introduces the
applied metrics. Results are presented in Section 5. A dis-
cussion of these results and the identified weaknesses follows
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
Navigation systems draw information form multiple sources
to make routing decisions. Besides the current position,
which is usually determined with GPS, static map data
stored in the device constitutes a main information source.
Streets are represented by directed graphs, where nodes rep-
resent intersections or fixed points on the map and edges
represent streets connecting nodes. Directed multigraphs
are used to represent multiple lanes, i.e., two nodes can be
connected with multiple edges. Direction of a lane is repre-
sented by edge direction. Additional attributes can express
the type of streets, speed limits, etc. Edges are weighted. In
the easiest implementation, a weight represents the length
of a street segment, but weights may also be time-dependent
to indicate different traffic situations over the day. The lat-
ter enables devices to optimize routes for the current time of
day. To identify the optimal route, the cheapest path from
start to finish has to be found. Different graph search algo-
rithms exist to calculate these paths, for example, Djikstra’s
SPF [2] or A* [1].
Another information source for PNDs are dynamic traffic
messages. Service providers as well as some PND vendors,
like TomTom1 or Garmin2, collect driving information from
their users to generate time-dependent traffic information.
TomTom devices with iQ-Routes come preloaded with a
database filled with the information from over 10 billion
driven kilometers. This additional information is used to
calculate the most effective route for the driver depending
on the current time of day, which might not necessarily be
the shortest. Garmin offers nu¨Link! online services, which
provides traffic information and Internet search functional-
ity to models equipped with an integrated GSM module.
In addition to proprietary solutions, different services ex-
ist to broadcast information about traffic jams, accidents,
or other incidents to vehicles. The most common service
is the Traffic Message Channel (TMC ), which is a partic-
ular service of the Radio Data System (RDS), now under
control of the Traveller Information Services Association3
(TISA). TMC provides travel information via signals broad-
cast over the FM-Data-Channel. TMCpro is an improved
derivative of the TMC service, operated as a commercial
service by Navteq.4 While TMC relies mainly on reports by
drivers, TMCpro utilizes real-time traffic data automatically
generated by data sensors, which are installed on highways.
The process of extracting traffic warning from the gathered
data is automated and not subject to editorial control. As
the extension possibilities of TMC and TMCpro are limited,
the TPEG5 standard, also maintained by TISA, is able to
provide more precise information about traffic jams or acci-
dents. TPEG will replace TMC as the standard service to
transmit dynamic traffic information.
1TomTom website: http://www.tomtom.com/
2Garmin website: http://www.garmin.com/
3TISA website: http://www.tisa.org/
4Navteq website: http://www.navteq.com/
5Transport Protocol Experts Group
Navigation system manufacturers also provide other features
to improve user interaction. For example, in order to pro-
vide more precise announcements, some devices use text-
to-speech technology to convert natural language text into
speech. This enables the inclusion of street names and other
dynamic attributes into announcements, which helps the
driver to relate the provided information to the real world
environment.
3. STUDY DESIGN
The goal of our study is the comparison of the interaction
behavior of different navigation systems under real world
driving conditions. We focus on the frequency of naviga-
tion commands and messages, as well as the quality of the
provided messages. See Section 4 for the employed metrics.
But first, we describe the analyzed devices and the driving
scenarios of the study.
3.1 Devices
For the study, only portable navigation devices (PNDs) have
been considered as they constitute the most commonly used
type of navigation systems [5]. Due to their portability they
also facilitate comparison under the exact same conditions,
as multiple PNDs can be installed in one car.
We want to gain a reasonable overview of the interaction
concepts currently prevalent in the market and, therefore,
selected devices covering bottom-range ($), mid-range ($$),
and top-range ($$$) segments of the German PND market.
The analyzed devices are listed in Table 3.1. In the re-
mainder of this paper, we will refer to the devices by their
designated labels.
Three of the five test devices support the reception of dy-
namic traffic information via TMC or TMCpro. Tomtom
further supports the iQ routes system, while Garmin only
supports the Garmin operated nu¨Link! service. Pearl, as
a bottom-range device, is the only navigation system that
does not come directly with a receiver for dynamic traffic
information services. Note that text-to-speech is only sup-
ported by the mid-range and top-range devices.
3.2 Driving Scenarios
The performed test drives were split into predefined driving
scenarios to analyze the behavior of the navigation systems
in different situations. During the test drives, the devices
were mounted on a common board inside the vehicle. A
setup of two cameras monitored the audiovisual output of
the navigation systems as well as the current road situation.
Additionally, two persons transcribed navigation commands
and audiovisual messages issued by the devices. Fig. 1 de-
picts the in-car setup. In preparation for each scenario, all
tested devices were set to the same destination, and it was
verified that the devices calculated a similar route (Rc). De-
pending on the driving scenario (see below) deliberate devi-
ations from the route were planned and performed, resulting
in a different driven route (Rd). The driven route Rd is sup-
posed to reflect the intentions of a driver and the driver’s
belief of the correct route.
The driving scenarios have been designed to specifically an-
alyze how the devices react in common driving situations.
Figure 1: In-car setup of the navigation systems.
Thereby, a balanced mixture of urban, suburban, rural, and
highway road usage was factored in.
Detour (city). The calculated route Rc is left for a de-
liberate urban detour. A typical reason for such driving
behavior would be the need to run quick errands before em-
barking onto the actual journey, e.g. to stop by a grocery
store or drop children off at school. In this scenario, the
driven Rd and the calculated route Rc do not match. The
main purpose is to analyze how devices react to deviations
from the route. Road usage in this scenario is mainly urban
and suburban.
Highway. On the highway, commands of the navigation
systems are followed to analyze normal operation. In ad-
dition, a stop at a petrol station is simulated to see how
navigation systems react.
Inner city. In this scenario, the routing behavior of the
devices close to a destination is analyzed. Devices should
support the driver in finding the destination, yet provide
freedom to search for a parking spot in proximity of the
destination. Urban roads dominate this scenario.
Detour (rural). Similar to the detour (city) scenario, the
driver deviates from the route on purpose. However, the
detour is chosen over rural roads in such a way that there is
no obvious alternative route the PNDs could switch over to.
A typical scenario for this case would be the spontaneous
decision to visit some touristic attraction or friends who live
close to the original route.
Dynamic traffic warning. Here, we deliberately travel a
chosen route during rush hour with many traffic jams along
the route. The aim of this scenario is the analysis of the
integration of dynamic traffic warnings. Of special inter-
est is the presentation of the warning message, associated
information, and potential alternatives to the driver.
The first four scenarios were combined in one route from
Ulm University, just outside the town of Ulm, to a loca-
tion in the inner city of Munich, and back. Fig. 2 gives an
Table 1: Analyzed Devices
Label Manufacturer and model Text-to-speech Dynamic traffic services Price segment
Becker Becker Traffic Assist Z205 yes TMC, TMCpro $$$
Garmin Garmin nu¨vi 1690 yes nu¨Link! $$$
Falk Falk F6 yes TMC, TMCpro $$
Tomtom TomTom XL Europe yes TMC, iQ Routes $$
Pearl Pearl V35-1 no - $
detour
(city)
detour
(rural)
highway
inner
city
Figure 2: The calculated route Rc (blue) and the different scenarios (red). Map data: OSM.org
overview of the planned route Rc (blue), the different sce-
narios, and the driven route Rd (red). The dynamic traffic
warning scenario was performed and tested separately, as
one had to dynamically look for suitable traffic jams.
4. METRICS
To allow an objective comparison of the different devices
under test, we define specific metrics for measuring their
behavior. First of all, we distinguish between acoustic and
visual messages and navigation commands. Visual messages
contain all information that is shown on the display. Acous-
tic messages are voice instructions from the system, which
either support visual messages or provide distinct informa-
tion. A navigation command may consist of an acoustic or
visual message, or both. For example, a typical navigation
command for turning right in 300 meters would consist of
the acoustic message “turn right in 300 meters” and a visual
message on the display composed of an arrow pointing to
the right and the distance below or next to it. Animations
that convey device activity are also counted as visual mes-
sages, e.g. two animated turning arrows when the route is
recalculated.
In the analysis, we distinguish observed navigation com-
mands according to message correctness and driver antic-
ipation. We define message correctness to reflect the cor-
rectness of the issued navigation command in terms of the
driver’s intention. This means a message is correct, if its
content conforms with and supports the driver’s belief of
the correct route. All other messages are labeled false. In
our study, all events that correspond to the route intended
by the driver Rd are labeled as correct.
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Figure 3: Definition of four message categories.
Driver anticipation measures if the driver can expect the
message or if the message comes as a surprise, i.e., is unex-
pected. Expected messages are predictable in the sense that
they fit the current situation and align with the behavior
of the driver, but not necessarily with the driver’s intention.
They constitute the majority of all messages. All other mes-
sages appear unexpected. In our study, a message is labeled
expected if it supports the calculated route Rc in the current
situation.
Fig. 3 depicts the two axes and the four possible message cat-
egories. Correct/expected messages constitute desired nav-
igation commands. Correct/unexpected messages provide
correct information but are not anticipated in the current
situation, e.g., the message “follow the road for 60 kilome-
false correct
expected
unexpected
41% 56%
2%1%
Figure 4: Average distribution of all observed mes-
sages.
ters” is correct but unexpected if the driver has been follow-
ing this road for several kilometers already. False/expected
messages occur when the driver deviates from the route. The
message content does not conform to the driver’s intention,
but due to explicitly leaving the route such messages can
be anticipated by the driver, e.g., repeating “turn around”
messages. The instruction to turn around while driving on a
highway falls in the category of false/unexpected messages.
5. RESULTS
In the following, we present the results of the performed
study and analyze the behavior of the tested devices for
each driving scenario.
In total, 162 kilometers where driven in 2:06 hours. In this
time, 189 acoustic messages and 191 visual messages have
been observed. Due to GPS radio reception problems, the
Tomtom device had to be replaced to the side window, where
it could not be captured by the camera anymore. However,
the behavior of the Tomtom device was still observed and
recorded manually.
The cumulative observation results over all devices and the
first four driving scenarios are given in Fig. 4. Unexpected
messages account only for 3% of all messages. The rea-
sons for their occurrence are GPS radio reception problems.
Thus, these messages are indeed dangerous but relatively
rare. False/expected messages account for 41% of all ob-
served messages, while merely 56% of all messages were cor-
rect/expected. While the extreme nature of the chosen driv-
ing scenarios degraded these values compared to a normal
drive, it shows that PNDs react inflexible to changing driver
intentions. Interestingly, all devices behaved quite similar
irrespective of their price segment.
A detailed analysis of each driving scenario is provided in
the following, highlighting typical reactions and behavior.
The cumulative results for each scenario are summarized in
Fig. 5.
5.1 Detour (city)
The 16 km long scenario was completed in 24 minutes. As
expected, all devices called on the driver to turn around,
as soon as the driver deviated from the planned route. The
Falk called on the driver to turn around seven times (Becker
five times, Pearl three times). As acoustic messages, Pearl
and Becker used phrases like“turn left, then turn left”. Only
Falk used the words “please turn around”.
With 41 acoustic messages, the Pearl was most active in
this scenario, while the Becker acted very passive, with only
six acoustic messages. Falk and Pearl produced nine false
messages each, Becker only produced seven. Messages were
false in the sense that they did not correspond to the driver’s
intention. Falk and Pearl recalculated their route nine times
(indicated by visual messages). In case of the Pearl two of
the recalculations resulted from GPS radio reception prob-
lems. The Becker performed six recalculations.
Fig. 5(a) gives the cumulative results for this scenario. The
high percentage of correct/expected messages (57%) results
from the fact that all devices stopped issuing turn around
messages and reverted to an alternative route R′c as soon as
that route became shorter than he orignal route Rc. Subse-
quently, mainly correct/expected messages were issued, be-
cause R′c corresponded to Rd. Thus, the 40% false/expected
messages occurred almost completely in the first minutes of
this scenario.
5.2 Highway
In this scenario, we analysed the devices’ behaviour during a
highway trip, where the driver followed the calculated route,
i.e., the driven route Rd matched the calculated route Rc.
As expected, all navigation systems remained passive and
calm during the whole trip of 123 kilometers (76 minutes).
The average number of visual messages was 10.6, from which
74.4% have been correct (see Fig. 5(b)). There have been
an average of 4.3 acoustic messages during the scenario. At
one point, shortly before the end of the scenario, the calcu-
lated route Rc of two PNDs differed from the others and the
intended route Rd.
To simulate the refueling at a petrol station, the highway
was left once. Due to the fact that the gas station was lo-
cated near the shoulder of the highway, none of the devices
corrected the displayed position but continued showing the
car on the highway. When the trip was resumed, one de-
vice temporarily displayed an erroneous position and orien-
tation for the car. Because the device believed the vehicle
to be driving in the opposite direction, the driver was in-
structed to leave the highway at the next exit to turn around
(false/unexpected message).
5.3 Inner city
During the inner city scenario (17 km, 19 minutes), reli-
able routing by all devices was observed. 92.5% of visual
messages and all of the acoustic messages were correct (see
Fig. 5(c)). The precise acoustic messages provided by the
Falk device near intersections are notable. Announcements
included the indication of direction and street names. For
example, “In 500 meters, leave the highway towards B13
Munich, therefore keep right” in contrast to instructions like
“After 800 meters, keep right, then keep left” issued by other
devices. After reaching the destination, which all devices
announced acoustically, all devices suspended routing and
switched into free drive mode to support the driver in the
search for parking.
false correct
expected
unexpected
40% 57%
1%2%
(a) Detour (city)
false correct
expected
unexpected
13% 83%
1%1%
(b) Highway
false correct
expected
unexpected
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false correct
expected
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Figure 5: Message Distribution for the different driving scenarios.
5.4 Detour (rural)
In this scenario, the driver deviated from the calculated
route Rc onto rural roads. Roads with few intersections
were chosen to reduce potential alternative routes the de-
vices could change to. The detour extended over 6 km (7
minutes) before the driver turned around eventually. In this
time, 6.3 route recalculations were performed on average.
This corresponds to 1.16 recalculations per kilometer by
Becker and Pearl, and 0.83 recalculations by Falk. None
of the devices explicitly informed the driver about the rea-
son of recalculation. Instead, turn around commands were
repeatedly issued.
In combination with the large number of messages (one
acoustic message every 37 seconds, one visual message ev-
ery 57 seconds, on average) the behavior suggests, that the
driver is rather stressed than supported by the devices.
5.5 Dynamic traffic warning
The integration of dynamic traffic warnings by the PNDs
has been analyzed independently of the other four scenar-
ios. We analyzed the behavior of devices in situations where
warnings about traffic obstructions on the planned route Rc
appeared. Hereby, the focus was placed on the information
the devices provide about the obstruction and how it is con-
veyed, as well as the decision support provided to the driver.
Due to different information sources for the dynamic traf-
fic warnings, the listing of traffic information varied between
devices, e.g., between Becker (TMC) and Garmin (nu¨Link!).
Additionally, TMC messages can also differ strongly between
devices, because, in Germany, radio broadcasting corpora-
tions are responsible for creating and updating traffic infor-
mation. Each broadcasting corporation relies on it’s own
mix of different information sources, e.g., listeners, automo-
bile associations like the German ADAC6, or police notifi-
cations.
If traffic warnings existed, the driver could call up a list of
received warnings and their information on all devices. A
detailed view for each message provides the reason for the
obstruction (traffic jam, accident, etc.) and displays the ap-
proximate position of the obstruction. None of the tested
devices provided information about a message’s time of ori-
gin. When a dynamic traffic warning for an obstruction on
the planned route Rc is received, the tested devices call on
the the driver to decide if the traffic jam should be circum-
vented.
As an example, Fig. 6 show the dialog of the Becker device.
A traffic jam is depicted as a purple area on the planned
route (red). A symbol on the right depicts the type of ob-
struction. The navigation system provides only one alterna-
tive to avoid the obstruction. Only approximations of the
6ADAC – Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club e. V.:
http://www.adac.de
Figure 6: Recommended route to circumvent the
traffic jam.
Figure 7: Display of an obstruction of traffic and the
possibility to avoid this route.
saved time and the distance difference of the detour are pro-
vided as additional information. How the value of, in this
case, 28 minutes has been determined is not obvious to the
driver and not explained by the system. If additional in-
formation is available for the calculation of the saved time,
e.g., characteristics of the traffic jam, it is not displayed to
the driver. In the example, it is also not obvious and not
explained, why this exact route (yellow) is recommended
to avoid the traffic jam, while several other (presumably
shorter) routes are discernible on the map (see Fig. 6).
However, other devices, e.g., the Garmin, do not even dis-
play the alternative route to the driver. Fig. 7 shows that
the only information available to support the driver’s deci-
sion is the length of the traffic jam (0.1 km) and the cause
of the obstruction (construction site). Thereby, the degree
of obstructions is displayed in different colors, e.g., green
indicates a slight obstruction and red indicates a heavy ob-
struction.
In general, the tested devices provide not enough informa-
tion about the obstruction and possible alternatives to en-
able the driver to make an informed decision about staying
on the route or avoiding the obstruction. Unfortunately, the
tested devices did also not provide a recommendation for
the best choice.
6. DISCUSSION
In this Section, the results from the study are discussed and
interaction weaknesses are summarized.
Currently, a driver can only influence the route prior to a
trip by choosing between different route characteristics, e.g.,
shortest, fastest, or most economic route. Furthermore, the
driver can choose to avoid toll roads or highways. Based
on these adjustments, the navigation system calculates the
route. At this point no reasons are given why this particular
route is chosen, and the driver has no opportunity to com-
pare this route to other alternatives. A comparison maybe
performed internally by the system, but it is invisible to
the driver. Almost all devices instantly started the route
guiding. Only the Pearl displayed a general overview of
the planned route before commencing navigation. While in-
stantly switching to route guiding might save time, display-
ing a route overview can prevent mistakes due to wrongly
selected destinations.
The study showed that PNDs are reliable and perform well
in normal situations, when the calculated route Rc matches
the intended route Rd. However, while all PNDs issued cor-
rect and expected messages for navigation commands, sev-
eral devices produced cryptic messages. Here, the top range
devices performed notably better.
When the driver deviates from the calculated route Rc on
purpose, the devices are not able to dynamically adapt to the
driver’s decision. The driver is not properly informed about
the deviation detected by the device, route recalculations
occur mostly silently and are only accompanied by short
visual messages (e.g. turning progress arrows). The navi-
gation systems instruct the driver to turn around but give
no indication why, i.e., to return to the calculated route Rc.
Interestingly, only one device actually used the vocal instruc-
tion “turn around”, while the others resorted to sequences of
turn commands (“turn left, then left”). The latter behavior
not only increases the number of messages but also does not
convey the intention of the device to the driver. Further-
more, the driver has no possibility to inform the navigation
system about its intention (deviation from the route) with-
out performing multiple clicks in touch menus to abort the
routing process.
The study showed further that in both scenarios where the
driver left the route intentionally the navigation systems
produced 56% false acoustic and 65% false visual messages
in total, respectively. While those messages can be expected
by the driver, because they intentionally left the route, the
observed frequency and persistence of such messages sug-
gests increased stress for the driver in already stressful sit-
uations. In contrast, the numbers of correct messages were
considerable higher in scenarios, where the driver followed
the calculated route (93% correct acoustic and 88% correct
visual messages).
Another critical point is the interaction concerning dynamic
traffic warnings. While tested devices that support the re-
ception of dynamic traffic warnings notified the driver about
obstructions on the planned route, the provided information
is often not sufficient for the driver to make an informed deci-
sion if the obstruction should be avoided or not. The driver’s
options for interaction are also very limited. The driver can
either accept the calculated detour (which is not displayed
by all devices) or continue on the current route. It remains
to be analyzed what information needs to be displayed to
actually support the driver in this decision and to improve
system credibility in such scenarios.
In summary, major interaction weaknesses could be identi-
fied for the route selection, the purposeful deviation from
routes, and the integration of dynamic traffic warnings. Al-
though the study included devices of different price ranges,
the issues were prevalent throughout all devices with minor
variations.
We conclude that in order to improve credibility, the inter-
action between the driver and the system must be improved.
The driver should be able to comprehend system decisions,
e.g., why a specific alternative route has been selected and
not another. At the same time, devices should enable the
driver to interact with them in order to convey changes in
driving intention. With improved bidirectional information
interchange, the amount of false messages could be poten-
tially reduced and the devices could better adapt to drivers.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the interaction behavior of several
current personal navigation devices. We designed driving
scenarios to analyze the behavior of PNDs from different
categories in specific situations. All devices have been tested
in parallel to ensure the same conditions.
The results of the study support our hypothesis that PNDs
perform well as long as drivers follow their directions, but fail
in deviating situations. As soon as the driver leaves the cal-
culated route, all devices show interaction weaknesses. They
issue cryptic commands (“turn left, then left”) repeatedly,
without communicating the actual problem to the driver,
e.g., that the driver left the calculated route. While this be-
havior is desired to some extent when the driver leaves the
route by accident, it becomes an annoyance in situations
where the driver acts on purpose. Current PNDs are not
flexible enough to cater for both situations. We argue that
the root cause of these problems is the lack of interactivity
with the driver en route. While vendors constantly work to
improve routing functionality, as well as output mechanisms
(e.g., text to speech), what is missing in today’s devices
are information exchange loops between driver and device.
The navigation system does not expose enough information
about its internal decisions. Instead, they should offer mean-
ingful information about commands and route alternatives
to empower drivers to understand why a certain route has
been recommended. Otherwise navigation systems risk the
loss of credibility with the driver.
At the same time, drivers have neither explicit nor implicit
means to communicate their dynamic intentions to the nav-
igation device.
They can only influence routing beforehand by specifying a
vague route preference, e.g. fastest route. We claim that
such static settings are not sufficient to capture a person’s
driving habits. Instead, navigation systems should utilize
available sensors to implicitly infer the driving behavior over
time and adapt accordingly. Furthermore, by offering mean-
ingful interaction opportunities and alternatives, navigation
systems could engage in a dialog with the driver, better
adapt to the driver, and maintain high credibility. However,
great care is required in interaction design to ensure that
the driver can concentrate on the primary task – operating
the vehicle.
We are currently developing and evaluating an interaction
model for navigation systems. Our model facilitates dy-
namic adaptation to driver intentions and addresses the is-
sues uncovered in this work by improving the credibility of
interaction processes.
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